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Abstract. 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) 
Program is presented.   As a result of the loss of seven astronauts and the Space Shuttle 
Columbia on February 1, 2003, NASA has undergone many changes in its organization.  NDE is 
one of the key areas that are recognized by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
that needed to be strengthened by warranting NDE as a discipline with Independent Technical 
Authority (iTA).   The current NASA NDE system and activities are presented including the latest 
developments in inspection technologies being applied to the Space Transportation System 
(STS).   The unfolding trends and directions in NDE for the future are discussed as they apply to 
assuring safe and reliable operations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 1, 2003 the world lost  seven astronauts and the Space Shuttle 
Columbia.   This catastrophic failure is understood to have been caused by a 
piece of foam insulation being released during launch from the Space 
Transportation System’s (STS) external tank (ET).  The sprayed on foam 
insulation (SOFI) debris struck the brittle matrix, reinforced carbon composite 
(RCC) wing leading edge of the Space Shuttle.   The impact created a breach or 
damage in the leading edge large enough that the RCC no longer served as an 
adequate thermal protection barrier for re-entry operations.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
 
Since February 1, 2003, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has aggressively pursued organizational, vehicle structural, and 
operational changes that would minimize risk.    
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20050236276 2019-08-29T21:00:54+00:00Z
 2 
Organizationally, on July 15, 2003 NASA created the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC). NESC has three main themes:  
–Safety through engineering excellence 
–Mission success starts with safety 
–Safety starts with engineering excellence 
 
NESC is cultivating a safety culture by providing knowledgeable technical 
leadership to perform independent in-depth technical assessments in an open 
environment with unequalled tenacity.  The scope of NESC  is to provide 
independent in-depth technical assessments, independent trend analysis, 
independent systems engineering analysis, support mishap investigations, and 
support NASA programs with a focus on high risk programs. 
 
NESC is proactively addressing test and analysis of issues or trends not currently 
being addressed by the program, actively providing independent review of known 
risk areas, and reactively performing independent investigation of mishaps and 
close calls. 
 
In order to perform these functions, NESC identified Principal Engineers located 
at NASA Langley Research Center, Chief Engineers (NCE) located at each 
NASA Field Center,  Systems Engineers located across the Agency, Chief 
Scientist, Chief Astronaut, and NESC Discipline Experts (NDE) for specific 
disciplines located across the Agency.  The discipline areas include: Fluids/Life 
Support/Thermal, Flight Sciences, Guidance Navigation and Control, Human 
Factors, Materials, Mechanical Analysis, Mechanical Systems, Non-Destructive 
Evaluation, Power and Avionics, Propulsion, Software, and Structures.  NDE’s, 
Chief Scientist and Chief Astronaut are the leaders of National expert teams 
called Super Problem Resolution Teams (SPRT).   
 
The SPRTs are the backbone of NESC and have membership from multiple 
sources including NASA, industry, academia, other Government Agencies, and 
international experts.  The SPRTs provide technical support of NESC 
assessments, provide independent consolatory expertise, provide expertise for 
reviews and leadership as well as perform independent test, analysis and 
evaluation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.  Organizational Chart of NESC 
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 3 
 
Disciplines often have some overlap between discipline areas.  In an effort to 
minimize this overlap, each discipline is defined. The discipline activities in 
Nondestructive (NDE) are also listed as Nondestructive Inspection (NDI), and 
Nondestructive Testing (NDT) and the scope of the NDE activities is given by: 
 
“NDE is the use of nondestructive interrogating energy to determine the integrity 
of systems.  The systems may be organic or inorganic, simple and complex, and 
may be structural or non-structural, like wire.  A real-time application of NDE in 
systems is called structural integrated health monitoring.  The entire 
electromagnetic spectrum is available for performing a NDI and ranges from 
direct electrical current to radio waves through microwaves, infrared, optical, 
ultraviolet, x-rays, through to gamma rays, as well as sound vibrations and 
accelerated atomic particles. Both complex bulk systems and films are 
characterized.   The interrogated system size may vary from atomic level 
variations to large, meter long, macroscopic flaws.   A wide variety of instrument 
systems are used to make an evaluation.  As an example of the range of NDE 
instruments, a visual NDI may be an accepted NDT method. In contrast, the use 
of neutrons to produce a 3D neutron tomographic image may also be acceptable.  
NDE instruments often utilize more that one spectral component to have effective 
NDT, and often more than one NDE instrument is applied to secure full coverage. 
Many flight components used in NASA’s missions require adaptation of 
advanced NDE technologies in order to be applicable for integrity determination.  
Nondestructive integrity determination includes characterization of engineering 
properties, strain, stress, load verification, cracks, voids, inclusions, disbonds, 
delaminations, bonding, corrosion, erosion, constitutive components, volume 
fraction, orientation, impact damage, age, pressure, mass loss, mass gain, 
thinning, alignment, thermal diffusivity, emissivity, leaks, signature, 
contamination, elements, etc.” 
 
The operations of each of the discipline SPRTs are quite different and a 
description on how the NDE SPRT operates is provided here.   The SPRT is 
considered a source of National NDE knowledge.  When an inspection issue is 
brought to the NDE SPRT via the NESC Review Board (NRB), a leader of a sub-
team called a “component-specific” NDE SPRT, e.g. Flowliner NDE SPRT.   The 
leader holds a series of introductory telecoms where everyone on the NDE SPRT 
is invited to participate.  Detailed telecoms occur shortly there after and the main 
players that have interest and critical knowledge form a core team and become 
the Component-Specific NDE SPRT.   The core team allows observing members 
to attend subsequent meetings.  Observing members are often members that 
may have a conflict of interest or they are not independent, such as, they are 
actively working on the NDE issue.  However, the presence of the observing 
members provides two main functions.  The first is to provide additional 
information to the core team as requested.  The second is to provide the 
observers with some prior knowledge of what the core team is considering as 
final recommendations are being developed. The core team clarifies to the NRB 
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the questions to be answered.  In general, a multi-day on-site visit occurs in order 
to review the current NDE activities in the area of concern.  This on-site visit 
results in an evaluation of the status of the issues, and a signed report of findings 
and recommendations is developed.  During on-sites visits, the findings and 
recommendations are reported to the Program management as well as all NDE 
personnel involved in the issue. 
 
Upon completion and delivery of the findings and recommendations report to the 
Program, the NDE SPRT offers to assist the Program in addressing the NDE 
issues.  The prior presence of the observing members during NDE SPRT 
operations allows the smooth formation of a larger team consisting of the NDE 
SPRT and the Program Office NDE personnel.  Elements of the larger team 
share responsibility for addressing specific areas at the request of the Program 
Office. 
 
Establishing Independent Technical Authority 
 
The NESC provides data and technical opinions but does not provide authority 
as recommended by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).  Specific 
recommendation is to establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority 
that is responsible for technical requirements and waivers to them, and will build 
a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing and controlling 
hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.  The independent 
technical authority does the following as a minimum: 
 
• Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle Program 
projects and elements. 
• Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards. 
• Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and enterprise 
levels. 
• Own the failure mode, effects analysis. 
• Conduct integrated hazards analysis. 
• Decide what is and is not an anomalous event. 
• Independently verify launch readiness. 
• Approve the provisions of the recertification program. 
 
On November 23, 2005, NASA formed the independent Technical Authority 
(iTA).  The NASA Chief Engineer is responsible for all NASA technical 
requirements affecting safe and reliable operations, and delegates Technical 
Authority to individuals identified as Technical Warrant Holders.  iTA is formally 
established via NASA policies NPD 1240.4 and NPR 1240.1 where Independent 
Technical Authority is defined as the authority, responsibility, and accountability 
to establish, approve, and maintain technical requirements, processes, and 
policy in support of mission-related programs and projects independent of 
program organizational or financial control.  Technical Warrant Holders (TWH) 
have received delegated authority from the NASA Chief Engineer for specific 
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programs (System TWH) or technical areas (Discipline TWH).  The iTA/TWH has 
the final say regarding waivers, deviations or exceptions to requirements or 
standards affecting safe and reliable operations. 
 
The iTA resides in an individual and is not an organization.  The iTA is clear and 
unambiguous, independent of the Program Manager, credible (based on 
knowledge, experience, resources, personnel pipeline), and visible and accepted 
as valid, i.e., has influence and prestige. 
 
On January 13, 2005 NASA issued Technical Warrant Authority to selected 
discipline and system TWH including Nondestructive Testing, Propulsion, 
Structures, Materials, Space Shuttle, Space Station, etc.  To date there are 40 
TWHs. 
 
 
NASA modeled its iTA after the existing NAVSEA model, where is a balance in 
authority between operation need, program authority and technical authority as 
depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Balance in authority between operation need, program authority, and 
technical authority as modeled after the NAVSEA model. 
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The organizational chart of the NASA Technical Authority is shown in Figure 3.  
OSMA is The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of the TWHs is very extensive and specific responsibilities are listed 
below: 
 
a. Provide leadership and are accountable for all technical standards and 
requirements.  
b. Exercise integrity and discipline in providing sound technical judgments.  
c. Establish and maintain technical policy, technical standards, requirements and 
processes. 
d. Support Program and Project Managers by providing the engineering, 
technical standards, technical products, and advice necessary to ensure safe 
and reliable operations.  
e. Develop and maintain technical area expertise and personal credibility through 
professional development, certifications, and new technology awareness. 
f. Approve the consideration of risk, failure, and hazard analysis in providing 
technical requirements.  
g. Evaluate technically acceptable alternatives and perform associated risk and 
value assessments.  
h. Ensure technical products are in conformance with technical policy, standards, 
and requirements. Where they are not, identify and approve any 
non!conformance via an engineering variance (i.e. change, waiver, or deviation).  
i. Assure technical principles, capabilities, and concepts meet defined technical 
standards and requirements.  
Mission Director
Program Manager
Program Manager
Program Manager
Technical 
Warrant HolderTechnical
Warrant HolderTechnical 
Warrant Holder
Technical 
Requirements
Administrator
NASA Chief Engineer
Program 
Requirements Center Director
SMA Director
Compliance
Assurance
Notes: 1) The NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer, as the NASA Technical Authority for all health and medical 
requirements,Technical Authority flow is similar to that of the Chief Engineer.
2) The NASA Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer, as head of the OSMA, is accountable to the Deputy 
Administrator for providing leadership, policy direction, functional oversight, assessment and coordination for all Safety 
Assurance and Mission Assurance (SMA) (program and independent).
Warrant
Deputy Administrator
Safe, reliable 
and effective products
Technical 
Authority 
(NPR 1000.3A
July 30, 2004)
OSMA
(note 2)
Mission Director
FIGURE 3. Organizational chart of the NASA Technical Authority 
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j. Provide activities conducting verification, validation, certification functions (e.g. 
Flight Readiness Reviews, Assurance, etc.) and their approval on the technical 
requirements in their areas.  
k. Develop personnel requirements and succession planning.  
l. Ensure lessons learned are captured and available to others.  
m. Interface with other TWHs promoting communications throughout NASA 
technical community to ensure appropriate individuals and organizations are 
aware of technical issues.  
n.  Interface with the science, technology, human resources, and education 
communities of NASA.  
o. Maintain technical competency and expertise along with the resources needed 
in order to effectively perform their duties.  
p. Establish a subordinate network of technical/engineering agents, 
technical/engineering managers and other technical organizations as necessary 
to fulfill their responsibilities across NASA with accountability remaining with the 
TWH. 
q. When performing their warranted function, TWHs will charge to a overhead 
service pool as will their engineering agents, engineering managers and others 
who are performing technical work for the TWH in the execution of the warrant 
functions.  
r. Identify future resources needed to properly execute their responsibilities. 
 
 
 
NASA expends approximately $16 billion per year and the TWHs cannot possibly 
have detailed knowledge of day-to-day operations.  Therefore, the TWHs are 
empowered to deputize personnel across the NASA to  serve as the eyes and 
ears of the TWH.  These deputized personnel are called Trusted Agents and 
Engineering Agents, whose responsibilities are to assist the TWH is assuring 
safe and reliable operations. 
 
 
NASA NDE TECHNICAL ISSUES 
 
NASA has many technical issues that require advanced NDE technologies.  The 
inspection issues unique, one of a kind,  where complex advanced materials and 
structures are used and the failure mechanisms are not well understood.  This 
provides an enormous challenge in developing and applying NDE technologies, 
to meet changing inspection requirements. 
 
The inspection of the ET SOFI represents a unique and continuing challenge.  
Many inspection technologies were evaluated for use in detecting voids, 
disbonds, and delaminations in SOFI.   Typical structural configurations are 
shown in Figure 4.  The ET liquid hydrogen flange near a bipod joint is shown.  
One failure scenario proposed is that liquid nitrogen was formed  in the stringer 
volume, by condensation during the filling of the ET tank.  The nitrogen traveled 
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down through the flange bolt via the bolt threads and filled a void in the SOFI that 
was adjacent to the bolt threads near the bipod joint.  During launch the liquid 
nitrogen rapidly expanded to a gaseous form and popped off sections of the 
SOFI creating critical debris. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two technologies that have shown capability for inspecting SOFI for voids and 
delaminations are Terahertz Imaging and Backscatter X-ray.  The general 
configuration for  Terahertz Imaging of SOFI  is shown in figure 5 with typical 
output shown in figure 6.   Figure 6 also shows the technology development as a 
function of time and technology readiness levels.  A rapid increase in spatial 
resolution is observable during the first two years of the research effort.  Figure 7 
shows the backscatter x-ray image of a similarly configured panel.  Note that the 
foam can be seen to have infiltrated the stringer volume near the bolted 
attachment. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  Probability of Detection (POD) Panel model and actual POD panels 
with SOFI applied 
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FIGURE 5.  Time Domain Terahertz System 
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disbonds 
voids 
FIGURE 6.  Terahertz imaging of SOFI POD panel and technology readiness 
levels as a function of time. 
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FIGURE 7. Backscatter X-ray results, 2” of SOFI showing filled stringer volumes. 
Conathane is bonding agent used to join spray areas. 
 
 
An example of where technical oversight is useful is given by the International 
Space Station (ISS) Program plans to only do one weld inspection of the Space 
Station Module (figure 8).  Specifically, the one inspection would be done before 
proof test of the module.  There were other considerations here where the 
module’s structural identity was changed from a pressure vessel to a pressurized 
structure.  Each label having it’s own weld inspection requirements.  However, for 
one-of-a-kind critical pressurized aerospace components, full inspection after the 
proof test is required.  The reason for this is that during proof test the structure 
deforms and cracks may grow, or open up.   If there is only one inspection to be 
done it should be done after the proof test.  An inspection done before the proof 
test is to assure that the tankage will not fall apart during the test. 
Bolt 
Contrast enhance  
image shows: 
 
Filled region 
 
 
Empty region 
Conathane 
 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8.  Photo of ISS modules and weld inspection areas 
 
 
Another example of the value of the technical oversight is in the Primary 
Reaction Control System (PRCS)  thrusters.  The Space Shuttle uses PRCS 
thrusters  to control its orientation.  Cracks in the thrusters were observed in the 
relief radius and counter bore volumes of the thrusters (figure 10).  Adding to the 
complexity of inspecting this Columbium based structure is that the only entry 
available to examine the thruster counter bore and relief radius is through the 
0.15” acoustic cavity internal to the thruster.  Figure 11 highlights one eddy 
current configuration being developed to inspect the relief radius.   
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FIGURE 10. PRCS cut away view and metallographic cross-section of crack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metallographic 
cross-section 
of crack 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 11. Diagram of eddy current inspection system being developed to 
inspect the PRCS thrusters 
 
Inspection issues often are made extremely complex by limited access, for 
example, there are 22 Kevlar composite over-wrapped pressure vessels (COPV) 
in each Space Shuttle with operating pressures exceeding 3000 psi.  Removal of 
the COPVs for inspection may lead to increased risk of damage to surrounding 
equipment.  There is a concern that the COPV integrity may be compromised by 
aging processes that lead to stress rupture. Figure 12 shows a photo of a typical 
Kevlar COPV before and after rupture.  The inspection issue here is that there is 
no certified inspection methods for detect the onset of stress rupture or to 
establish the remaining life of COPVs.   
 
 
Although a considerable amount of progress in developing NDE technologies has 
been made in each of the component areas identified above, significant amount 
of worked is still needed to establish new NDE technologies for use in certifying 
components for flight. 
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The CAIB report recommends that NASA pursue the development of on-orbit 
inspection technologies. For missions to the ISS develop a practicable capability 
to inspect and effect emergency repairs to the widest possible range of damage 
to the TPS, including both tile and RCC, taking advantage of the additional 
capabilities available when near to or docked at the ISS.  For non-Station 
missions, develop a comprehensive autonomous(independent of Station) 
inspection and repair capability to cover the widest possible range of damage 
scenarios.  Accomplish an on-orbit TPS inspection, using appropriate assets and 
capabilities, early in all missions.  The ultimate objective should be a fully 
autonomous capability for all missions to address the possibility that an ISS 
mission fails to achieve the correct orbit, fails to dock successfully, or is damaged 
during or after undocking. NASA developed and installed an Orbiter Boom 
Sensing System (OBSS) shown in figure 13 as one of the  responses to this 
recommendation. 
 
 
COPV COPV failed test article 
FIGURE  12.  Photos of flight-like COPV and failed COPV  
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FIGURE 13.  OBSS graphical representation and actual hardware installed for 
return to flight vehicle OV-103. 
Sensor 
Package 
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The OBSS contains a  black and white high resolution intensified television 
camera and a laser  dynamic range imager as part of the inspection capability.  
During operation the boom arm is extended to control the orientation and 
placement of the sensors.  Typical imagery obtained during systems evaluation 
before flight is shown in figure 14.  Figure 14a shows the image observed when 
the wing leading edge is viewed with the camera normal to the wing surface. No 
crack is observed in this configuration.   Figure 14b shows the image observed 
when the wing leading edge is viewed 17-degrees off normal to the wing surface. 
A large crack is observed in this configuration, and this highlights the importance 
of lighting in visual inspections.  General guideline for using the inspection 
system included keeping sun light to the side or behind the camera, use scan 
speeds of a few meters per minute, and maintain approximately 6 ft between 
camera system and surface to be inspected.   
 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Impact damage from micrometeoroids is a major concern with space systems, 
where the damage may be of sufficient magnitude to breach the integrity of 
pressurized habitat modules.  The issue is made complex by the presence of 
thermal protection systems present on the modules exterior, and interior surfaces 
covered with critical mounted equipment. 
 
A concept demonstrator (CD) has been developed to understand the systems 
that must interact when forming a sensing vehicle skin that has the capability to 
locate, identify, and characterizes damage as well as coordinate repairs.   A 
hardware CD has been developed by a collaboration between NASA and the 
Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.  
Figure 15 shows a photo of the completed system, and figure 16 shows the 
output of the companion software simulator.  The structure consists of 48 
aluminum panels populated with a total of 768 acoustic emission sensors and 
self-reconfiguring communications network. Hypervelocity impact testing is 
currently being performed in order to establish the protocol for determining the 
degree of damage, as well as for evaluating the dynamic self-reconfigurable 
network capabilities of the system.
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b. RCC panel viewed from 17-degrees off normal, 5-foot range 
a. Normal view of RCC panel at 7-foot range and no cracks 
are observed  
FIGURE 14.  Camera images obtained during systems evaluation before flight.  
Figure 14a shows the image observed when the wing leading edge is viewed 
with the camera normal to the wing surface. .  Figure 14b shows the image 
observed when the wing leading edge is viewed 17-degrees off normal to the 
wing surface. 
Crack 
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FIGURE 15.  Photo of Sensing Skin Concept Demonstrator 
FIGURE 16.  Visual output of the companion CD simulator and monitor 
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SUMMARY 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Nondestructive 
Evaluation (NDE) Program has been presented as an evolving and growing 
entity.   As a result of the loss of seven astronauts and the Space Shuttle 
Columbia on February 1, 2003, NASA has undergone many changes in its 
organization and as a result has strengthened NDE activities by warranting NDE 
as a discipline with Independent Technical Authority (iTA).   The major NASA 
NDE issues and activities are discussed including the latest developments in 
inspection technologies being applied to the Space Transportation System 
(STS).   The unfolding trends and directions of NDE of the future are discussed 
as they apply to assuring safe and reliable operations. 
 
